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Norway, Switzerland, the European Union, Korea, Japan and some other countries 
place substantial emphasis on the so-called non-trade concerns in the ongoing WTO 
negotiations on further agricultural trade liberalisation. In addition to the production of 
food and fibre, agriculture also may provide national food security, environmental 
benefits, and viable rural areas. The term ³multifunctional agriculture´ has been in-
creasingly applied to describe these additional functions. This working paper focuses 
on how to achieve the multifunctional goals that nations may have with minimal trade-
distortion. In this study, the economic concepts of externalities and public goods are 
used to analyse non-trade concerns and multifunctional agriculture. It is argued that 
just as a tax is widely accepted as the optimum policy for a negative externality, so 
should the use of a production-tied subsidy or payment be accepted as optimum policy 
for a positive externality or public good that is produced jointly with or complementary 
to agricultural production. The study concludes with suggestions for international trade 
rules to prevent such policies from becoming a form of protectionism.  
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In the ongoing negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO) on further agricul-
tural trade liberalisation, a number of issues are to be taken into consideration, including 
the so±called non±trade concerns, special and differential treatment to developing coun-
try members, and the objective to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trad-
ing system. The preamble of the Uruguay Round¶s Agreement on Agriculture defines 
non-trade concerns as; inter alia, food security and the need to protect the environment. 
During the Uruguay Round, some countries also stressed the viability of rural areas as 
an important non±trade concern to be addressed in the reform process. According to 
Anderson (1998, p. 5), it is not surprising that the WTO is being confronted with these 
agricultural non±trade concerns. They are, after all, simply a subset of domestic policy 
issues that are interfacing increasingly with international policies as the globalisation of 
the world economy proceeds. Non±trade concerns are also reflected in the negotiation 
proposals submitted by the European Union (or strictly speaking the European Commu-
nity), Norway and some other countries.  
Agriculture provides, or may provide, more than just food and fibre²such as na-
tional food security, food safety, environmental benefits (cultural landscape1, land con-
servation, flood control, biodiversity, recreation), cultural heritage, and viable rural ar-
eas. The terms ³multifunctional agriculture´ or ³the European Model of Agriculture´ 
are increasingly applied to describe these additional functions; especially Norway, the 
European Union, Switzerland, Japan and Korea have put a lot of emphasis in this. Mul-
tifunctionality has lately also become an important subject matter within the OECD 
(OECD, 2001).  
                                                 
1 According to Olsson and R¡nningen (1999, p. 3), ³The concept of cultural landscape goes 
back to the German Kulturlandschaft, meaning µlandscape formed or influenced by human 
actvity¶. « . Within English speaking countries, µcountryside¶ is the term normally used for 
the agricultural landscape. However, recently it seems that the term µcultural landscape¶ has 
also become more frequently used within Britain.´ 
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One of the questions debated in the WTO is whether ³trade-distorting´ subsidies, or 
subsidies outside the ³green box´2, are needed in order to provide governments signifi-
cant scope to pursue important non±trade concerns and a multifunctional agriculture. 
According to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture,  ³green box´ policies have to meet 
the fundamental requirement that they have no, or at most minimal, trade±distorting 
effects or effects on production (WTO, 2003a). In addition, the policies must be pro-
vided through publicly±funded government programmes and not subject to transfers 
from consumers, and they must not have the effect of providing price support to pro-
ducers. The European Union, Switzerland, Norway and Japan take the view that multi-
functionality justifies domestic support linked to agricultural production as well as trade 
policies to meet domestic objectives (Paarlberg et al., 2002, p. 322-323). These nations 
argue that the  ³green box´ criteria requiring that policies be minimally trade±distorting 
prevents them from meeting domestic objectives, and they call for an expansion of the  
³green box´ (Bohman et al., 1999, p. 6). Opponents, such as the United States and the 
Cairns Group3, argue that support to agriculture should be decoupled from production 
levels and that domestic objectives do not warrant trade interventions (Paarlberg et al., 
2002, p. 323), i.e., they tend to see multifunctionality as disguised protection.  
In this study, I take the view that the economic concepts of externalities, public 
goods, and market failure should be used to analyse non±trade concerns and multifunc-
tional agriculture. In the following, that conceptual framework will be developed, espe-
cially with reference to agriculture¶s impact on the environment and for viable rural 
areas, after first having looked briefly into the relationships between trade liberalisation, 
incomes and production. The study focuses on how to achieve the multifunctional goals 
that nations may have with minimal trade±distortion. It is argued that multifunctionality 
hardly can justify the use of market support while it may justify production±related 
budget support if the positive externalities are produced jointly with or complementary 
to agricultural production. I conclude the study with suggestions for international trade 
rules that may allow countries to meet domestic policy objectives with minimal trade-
distortion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 2 In WTO terminology subsidies in general are identified by ³boxes´ which is given the col-
ours of traffic lights: green (permitted), amber (slow down²i.e., to be reduced), red (forbid-
den). According to the Agriculture Agreement, quantitative import restrictions are forbidden; 
i.e., they are labelled as ³red´. Also, domestic support exceeding the reduction commitment 
levels in the ³amber box´ is prohibited. In addition, the Agriculture Agreement has a ³blue 
box´ for subsidies that are tied to programmes that limit production. ³Blue box´ support is 
exempt from reduction commitments.  
 3 The Cairns Group is a coalition of 17 agricultural exporting countries who account for one-
third of the world¶s agricultural exports (The Cairns Group, 2003). Members of the group 
are: Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Uru-
guay.  
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According to neo-classical economic theory, under given assumptions such as homoge-
nous products, free factor mobility, full information, and zero transaction costs the allo-
cation of resources obtained in perfectly competitive markets will be Pareto-efficient. 
The role of governments should, according to this, only be to ensure private ownership 
and the rules of the game. However, economic theory also tells us that public interven-
tion may be desirable in the case of market failure. Gravelle and Rees (1986, p. 3) put 
forward that many economists have seen cases of market failure as a legitimate basis for 
governmental policy (for interventions) that goes beyond that of providing the legal infra-
structure for the economy. Market failures in an economy are caused by externalities, 
public goods, and economies of scale (Bohm, 1988, p. 44; MacLaren, 1991, p. 256). 
The literature on market failure can be cast in the rigorous tradition of Arrow and De-
breu, and include propositions suggesting that policy can be Pareto-enhancing (Alves et 
al., 1991, p. 197). In the tradition of Pigou, the government is seen as an omniscient, 
benevolent dictator that intervenes in the economy to correct market failures. The state 
produces public goods, internalises social costs and benefits, regulates decreasing-cost 
industries effectively, and redistributes income Pareto-optimally (McCormick and Tolli-
son, 1981).  
A frequently used definition of externalities is that they are unintended impacts on 
other agents¶ production or consumption possibilities that are unaccounted for in exist-
ing prices or payment schemes. Positive externalities often have the character of public 
goods defined by two characteristics: undepletability (consumption of a good by one 
person does not reduce the consumption available to anyone else) and non-excludability 
(once the good has been provided for one consumer, it is not possible to prevent other 
people from consuming it) (Baumol and Oates, 1988, p. 18±19). The cultural landscape, 
for instance, confers benefits on all viewers of the landscape. At the same time, it is 
generally not possible to prevent people from appreciating an existing landscape 
(Hodge, 1991, p. 180±181). Compared to private goods, with well-functioning markets 
and correct pricing, the market adaptation of public goods is far more difficult. Some-
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times, the public goods/positive externalities will be automatically ³produced´ as a by-
product of food and fibre production, and without additional costs. In other cases, these 
goods will not be produced, or will be produced in sub optimal quantities, unless an 
³extra payment´ is assured. Consequently, in a free market situation a positive external-
ity or public good, as the cultural landscape, could be provided for below its optimum 
level (Dillman and Bergstrom, 1991, p. 262); i.e., we would have a domestic distortion 
or market failure.    
Agricultural production may result in negative external effects, such as nutrient runoff, 
erosion, and pollution from pesticide and herbicide use. Economists often speak in fa-
vour of trade liberalisation since reduced prices and budget support can lead to less in-
tensive agricultural production methods and hence reduced pollution of soil, water and 
atmosphere, and increased biodiversity (Buckwell, 1996,  p. 204±205; Ervin, 1997, p. 
10). Sumelius (1997, p. 80) agrees partly with this view, but also puts forward that there 
are negative external effects of freer trade. These may well include the loss of open 
landscapes and the loss of species dependent upon semi-natural ecotypes. Ervin (1997, 
p. 10) also recognises that in some areas land abandonment will cause environmental 
loss from degraded landscapes. Latacz±Lohman and Hodge (2001, p. 43) argue that ³If 
government policies reduce agriculture to areas competitive at world prices, the 
associated loss of countryside benefits may be substantial and may outweigh the 
(politically less visible) gains from freer trade´.  
Choice of production system may affect landscape values. Changes in agricultural 
landscapes over time show a polarization with intensification in some areas and aban-
donment in others, while varied farming landscapes, with small±scale landscape ele-
ments, generally provide richer habitats and higher aesthetic and recreational values 
(Fjellstad et al., 1999). Where agriculture is scarce, farming generally increases regional 
biodiversity. Potter et al. (1999, p. 7) argue that ³while liberalization may open up new 
opportunities for the refashioning and rebalancing of land use, particularly in upland 
areas, it must be regarded as a high risk strategy so far as the maintenance of a multi-
functional countryside is concerned. Some further agricultural restructuring is inevita-
ble for demographic and social reasons that are beyond policy control, but there will be 
limits beyond which the welfare gains from liberalization are outweighed by the social 
and environmental costs of the resulting depopulation and deskilling of rural areas.´  
Summing up the situation in the European Union (EU) before the CAP-reform in 
1992, Buckwell (1996, p. 204) argues that the policy, which was founded on the need to 
stimulate an undercapitalised, peasant agriculture at a time of food insecurity, had 
served its purpose and was ripe for change. He argues that in a situation where the EU 
had grown into the world¶s largest player in the international food markets, the agricul-
tural strategy had to change by moving away from market price support to a system of 
support which better balances and integrates the desire for farmers to play their full role 
as competitive providers of wholesome food and also providers of public environmental 
goods and balanced rural development (Buckwell, 1996, p. 211). 
However, although lack of food security mainly is a problem for poor people and 
poor nations, and that rich nations do not need to strive for self±sufficiency since they 
can buy what they need on international markets (see Parikh (1991, p. 30)), food secu-
rity may still be found as justification for policy intervention even in rich countries 
(Bredahl, Holleran and Northen, 1999; Flaten, 1999). From a national perspective 
food security might be defined as a situation in which ³the entire population in a coun-
try has access to enough and healthy food in times of a crises or a war either national 
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or international´ (Flaten, 1999, p. 9)4. These crises can include environmental crises, 
crop and animal diseases, extensive radioactive fallout, or major changes in global sup-
ply and demand. Even though the risks may be small, enough food is essential for all hu-
mans, which may justify policies regarding the issue. The public costs for such policies 
should therefore be a function of the population¶s risk aversion and its willingness to pay 
for such ³insurance´ (Lindland, 1998). According to Flaten (1999, p. 21), national food 
security can be obtained through the following strategies (after Sturgess (1992)): change 
in diet, food stocks, maintenance of agricultural inputs (e.g., land, animals, knowledge), 
safeguarding of foreign deliveries, and current production. 
Depopulation is an increasing problem in many rural areas. Many countries therefore 
have the political objective of maintaining and supporting the viability of rural areas. In 
general, a minimum of economic activity, and therewith a certain population basis, is 
necessary in order to secure viable rural societies. In OECD (1998, p. 57), it is found 
that the agro±food sector has significant economic linkages to other sectors of the econ-
omy and constitutes an important generator of employment in rural economies. Harvey 
(1999, p. 12) argues that the contribution of the agricultural sector to rural development 
can come from ³(a) activities of a world-competitive farming through its supply and 
marketing chains; (b) activities of ³re-creational´ farming5 through its land and rural 
resources management, supporting the delivery of Conservation, Amenity, Recreation 
and Environment (CARE) goods and the associated tourism, lifestyle and living/working 
space demands; (c) release of capital and labour presently associated with uncompeti-
tive farming to the local economy for other more productive and socially desirable 
uses´. Other linkages between agriculture and the viability of rural areas occur through 
the pluriactivity of farm families (Bryden et al., 1993; Jervell, 1999).  
                                                 
 4 Own translation from Norwegian. 
 5 ³Re-creational farming ± the parts of farming which, by virtue of their means and structure 
of production rather than their ends and products, provide for: environmental maintenance 
and re-creation; amenity and recreation; cultural integrity, re-creation of rural values and a 
creative foundation for rural development´ (Harvey, 1999, p. 12). 
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It can be said that neo-classical economic theory is concerned with economic efficiency, 
and not with income distribution. According to neo-classical economic theory, a free 
market (without market failures) will give a Pareto±optimal outcome. Normative trade 
theory has its basis in this aspect of neo±classical economic theory. According to Cor-
den (1984, p. 69), ³The central proposition of normative trade theory is that there are 
gains from trade and, more specifically, that given certain assumptions not only is free 
trade Pareto±superior to autarky but it is also Pareto±efficient, being superior to vari-
ous degrees of trade restriction´. MacLaren (1991) claims that this proposition provides 
the intellectual basis for the case in favour of moves towards freer trade and against that 
of protectionism in agriculture. However, economic theory also implies that there will 
be many possible Pareto±optimal outcomes of a free market, with unequal income dis-
tribution. The welfare theory in itself cannot tell which income distribution is ³just´. 
Gravelle and Rees (1986, p. 521) argue that the aim of government policy in addition to 
the correcting of market failures can be the achievement of what would be regarded as a 
desirable distribution of real income.  
Rayner et al. (1993, p. 68) find agricultural policy in the OECD countries as largely 
defensive by nature. Major objectives are the maintenance of farm incomes, the stabili-
sation of prices and income, support of rural communities and ensuring the security and 
stability of food supply. The two major objectives underlying this defensive assistance 
to agriculture are to redistribute domestic wealth in favour of farm producers and to 
insulate domestic food markets from trade shocks. Rayner et al. (1993, p. 68) argue that 
the redistribute or adjustment assistance programmes have been linked to the so±called 
³farm income problem´ or ³agricultural adjustment problem´ in recognition that agri-
culture is a declining sector in an economy experiencing modern economic growth. Ris-
ing agricultural productivity on a par with productivity growth on other major sectors of 
the economy, and shifts in relative demand away from food products (Engel¶s law), are 
the roots in this process where agricultural resources, especially labour, move out of the 
rural sector and into the growth sectors of the economy. If there is imperfect mobility of 
resources, there is a possibility of a structural disequilibrium known as the ³agricultural 
adjustment problem´. This ³problem´ is typified by an income gap between urban and 
farm sectors. Cochrane (1958) has seen this as a farm problem where the farmers are 
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caught in a treadmill, and also as an argument for agricultural income support. How-
ever, if lacking mobility of labour is the main problem, it would be reasonable to sup-
port structural changes, for example support to fast retirement of older farmers, retrain-
ing of farmers and agricultural workers, etc., see for example Tweeten (1989).  
According to Harvey (1999, p. 1), both economic logic and the history of farm re-
turns (in the UK) clearly show that supporting farm product prices and receipts does not 
increase farm incomes. The reason why is that increasing farm receipts encourages 
more people to stay in farming than otherwise and encourages more use of inputs than 
otherwise. Harvey (1999, p. 1) argues:   
 
³Both these effects tend to increase costs, leaving farm incomes (as the differ-
ence between receipts and costs) no higher than before. Since people will only 
remain in farming so long as their incomes (and lifestyles) are expected to be 
more attractive than those elsewhere, farm incomes are more determined by what 
people can earn elsewhere than by the receipts from farming´. 
  
So these policies cannot, in the end, do much to increase farm incomes. The effects of 
agricultural support are simply to increase the number of people trying to earn a full 
time living from the industry ± people who would otherwise have left (or gone part±
time) because they could earn more (or more easily) elsewhere now stay in the industry 
(Harvey, 2000). Matthews (2000, p. 79) points out that without farm support there 
would be fewer farmers (in Ireland), but that it is unlikely that they would work for a 
lower income. On the other hand, in my view, if nations have an objective to support 
rural communities and prevent depopulation then this may justify some agricultural 
support, especially if this support is targeted toward those areas that are most in danger 
of depopulation and desertification. 
If a nation has as an objective to improve the income of farmers compared to other 
groups in the society, it can be argued that this could be done better through direct in-
come support (or tax relieves). Corden (1974, p. 51) has shown that if there is a diver-
gence between the actual and the socially desired income distribution, the optimal pol-
icy to achieve this policy goal is an income subsidy. It follows from this that income 
support should be ³decoupled´ from production (MacLaren, 1991, p. 259). The use of 
market support (tariffs and export subsidies) and budget price support in the OECD 
countries should according to this be abolished and the income support should instead 
be given as non-trade distorting support payments. OECD (1990) also strongly recom-
mends direct payments to farmers if governments wish to provide income support to 
agriculture.  
However, there is another argument often put forward by several farmers and farm-
ers¶ representatives, many politicians, and some governments in the OECD area, and 
that is that market support is needed in order to sustain agricultural activities/production 
at present levels and therewith also the alleged multifunctional benefits of agriculture. 
Although the view that the multifunctional benefits of agriculture is dependent upon 
keeping agricultural activities/production at the current levels is highly debateable, let 
us here for simplicity take that view as ³given´. By using some basic welfare economics 
and comparing the economic efficiency of two different systems of support, budget 
price support, and tariffs, that leads to the same producer price and hence the same do-
mestic production level, it can be shown that the import tariff system is less economic 
efficient than the budget price support system, see for example Harvey (2000). So, the 
conclusion that the import tariff system is less economic efficient than the budget price 
support system, indicates that multifunctionality does not justify trade barriers. In addi-
tion, the import under the import tariff system is lower than under the budget price sup-
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port system, i.e., the import tariff system is more trade±distorting than the budget price 
support system. 
Changes in a country¶s trade policy towards freer trade will normally not be Pareto±
efficient, there will be both winners and losers. If the winners can compensate the losers 
fully and still be better off, the change in trade policy is said to be an improvement even 
if compensation is actually not paid according to the Kaldor-Hicks principle. However, 
MacLaren (1991, p. 256) argues that the gains from trade only are potential unless com-
pensation is actually paid to the losers. If effective redistribution (in the form of lump-
sum transfers) of income does not take place, then different groups in society, in pursu-
ing their own self-interest, may or may not support a change of trade policy. In Harvey 
(1999, p. 18±19) it is argued that, on both theoretical and practical grounds, changes in 
government policy cannot be regarded as optimal or politically practical unless the los-
ers are at least partially compensated through production/product neutral compensation 
payments. In addition to the direct income losses for farmers due to a possible substan-
tial reduction in agricultural support as a result of the WTO negotiations, another effect 
would be a reduction in the value of assets currently employed in agriculture, which 
would restrict the adjustment possibilities of the owners (farmers). To provide compen-
sation payments would improve their capability to adjust. It is also worth noticing that 
the reduction in the value of assets would be beneficial to new entrants to the agricul-
tural industry. 
The individual risk-averse agent in an economy will wish to reduce the risk of re-
duced income. If there is lack of complete risk markets, we will have a market failure. 
The lack of complete risk markets can be caused by asymmetric or imperfect informa-
tion associated with individual risk, i.e., unobservable outcomes, moral hazard and ad-
verse selection (MacLaren, 1991, p. 274). Ingersent (2002, p. 30) points out that insta-
bility of prices and incomes, and the consequent economic uncertainty, result in ineffi-
cient resource utilization and discourage investment. This gives the standard (a priori) 
economic case for government intervention for stabilising producer prices and farm 
incomes. Market stabilisation also formed one of the four elements of the proposal for a 
new CAP (named CARPE) recommended to the EU Commission by the authors of the 
Buckwell Report (Buckwell et al., 1997). According to Rayner et al. (1993, p. 69), insu-
lating policies shield the domestic market from fluctuations in international prices and 
reduce instability in internal prices. Such a policy can as a result, reduce the variability 
of agricultural gross income and provide benefits to risk-averse farmers. Due to these 
arguments tariffs on agricultural products should presumably not be reduced to zero, but 
to a level of for example 20±25% in the next WTO agreement on agriculture to prevent 
big domestic price fluctuations due to changing world market prices, which might be a 
result of substantial tariff reductions.  
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Historically, income objectives have perhaps been the main objectives of agricultural 
policy in the OECD countries. This has changed in some OECD countries where the 
focus has shifted somewhat towards policy intervention with the aim to correct market 
failures caused by externalities or public goods. This can also be expressed in the word 
multifunctionality of agriculture. One central point in my analysis is that we have to 
make a clear distinction between policies with the aim to improve farmers¶ income or 
welfare situation and policies to enhance a multifunctional agriculture (see Prestegard 
(1992). In other words, we should not mix the focus on the farmers¶ consumption abili-
ties (income concerns) and the focus on the farmers as producers of both private and 
public goods. Unfortunately, these two aspects are still more or less mixed in the agri-
cultural policies of the different OECD countries. If a country wants to give income 
support to farmers, this support should be ³decoupled´ from production. However, de-
coupling is not an obvious criterion for the desirability of domestic policy that does not 
have farm income as its (sole) objective (Josling, 2003).  
A central question will then be how to achieve the multifunctional goals that nations 
may have in a minimally trade±distorting way, or, more precisely: 
How to formulate the policy instruments? 
How to determine the level of support? 
Which policy instruments should be accepted as minimally trade±distorting within 
the WTO (i.e., accepted as ³green box´ support)? 
 
However, before looking into these questions it should be emphasised that there in some 
circumstances may exist possibilities to transform positive externalities/public goods 
into marketable private goods. To the extent that ³public good´ effects of agricultural 
activity can be privatised directly or used as inputs in the production of other private 
goods and services (for example agro±tourism), the need for public support to provide 
these goods can be reduced. Another argument is that voluntary organisations, or con-
servation, amenity and recreation trusts (carts) as Dwyer and Hodge (1996) term them, 
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may contribute directly to the provision of non±commodity outputs and externalities. 
Winter (2001) points out that one possibility is through the direct ownership of land, a 
second is entering into agreements with farmers and the third is influencing farmers to 
enter into agri±environmental schemes. However, though this may be a possible way of 
providing non±commodity outputs in the UK with its historic tradition of many, large 
and often powerful voluntary organisations as the National Trust, and the Royal Society 
for the Protection of Birds, the situation may be different in other OECD countries that 
do not have that type of voluntary organisations and historic traditions for peoples¶ in-
volvement in taking care of the countryside. In my view, there is no doubt that, even if 
there are some possibilities for transforming externalities/public goods into marketable 
goods and that voluntary organisations may play a certain role in providing positive 
externalities/public goods, there will still exist a significant role for governmental sup-
port programmes to enhance a multifunctional agriculture in OECD countries. 
There are two principle ways for the state to stimulate the production of non±food 
agricultural goods or services, regulation or economic incentives. Regulations can zone 
land use or restrict production practices, while the state can stimulate the provision of 
countryside benefits by offering economic incentives for adoption of specified actions 
(Hodge, 1991, p. 184±187). You need at least one policy instrument for each policy 
objective. This follows the Tindbergen results for policy optimisation, namely that to 
achieve several objectives simultaneously you need at least as many policy instruments 
as there are objectives. Of course, a given policy instrument can have effects on more 
than one objective, both positive and negative. In addition, the policy instruments will 
influence each other, and therefore it will often be useful to set up (and evaluate) pack-
ages of policy instruments to obtain an efficient policy to provide optimal outputs of 
both private and public goods (Romstad et al., 2000, p. 3), while at the same time mini-
mise the trade±distorting effects.  
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Studies in different countries have shown that there is a willingness to pay (WTP) for 
the maintenance of agricultural landscapes and other rural environmental goods and 
services, see for example Navrud (1992). When determining the appropriate level of 
agricultural support, it is of importance to try to estimate how much society is willing to 
pay for environmental and rural goods and services provided by agriculture. In these 
quantification studies, a survey is conducted where the public is questioned about its 
WTP (or willingness to accept compensation, WTAC) for certain hypothetical changes 
in the environmental quality, or about choices between different ³packages´ of envi-
ronmental quality and the price of each package (Hanley et al., 2001, p. 47). The most 
used method within the stated preference approach is the contingent valuation method 
(CVM). For example, Drake (1992), Pruckner (1995), Bergland (1998), and Rosenber-
ger and Walsh (1997) all used CVM to quantify non±agricultural amenity values of 
farmland. Other valuation methods are based on revealed preferences, for example the 
hedonic pricing method and the travel costs method. Le Goffe (2000), for example, used 
hedonic pricing to value externalities in agriculture and forestry in Brittany, located in 
western France. He examined the renting price of rural self±catering cottages, or gvtes. 
Le Goffe (2000, p. 400) found that it appears that the price of gvtes is negatively influ-
enced by intensive fodder and livestock farming, and positively related to permanent 
grassland.   
Drake (1992) used CVM to examine the Swedes¶ WTP for the preservation of the 
agricultural landscape. He found that the Swedes seemed willing to pay about 541 SEK 
per person per year (78 ECU) or 975 SEK per hectare per year (140 ECU) (May 1986). 
Drake (1992) claims that this was more than the net value of agricultural production in 
most parts of Sweden. The most important motive to preserve the agricultural landscape 
is that µmany animals and plants depend on the agricultural landscape¶. Another impor-
tant motive is that µthe landscape is beautiful¶. Another result was that the WTP per hec-
tare differs significantly between different forms of land use, for example the WTP per 
hectare for grazing land was approximately twice as high as the WTP per hectare for 
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grain production. The WTP per hectare also varied due to location, from 700 SEK (101 
ECU) in the southern parts to 1300 SEK (187 ECU) in the northern parts of Sweden. 
Drake (1992) argues that the policy implication could be that the government should 
pay the farmers for the production of the collective µopen and varied landscape¶. He 
further argues that subsidies based on acreage instead of price support may be an ade-
quate political solution.    
In a study from Rhode Island in the United States, Kline and Wilchelns (1996, p. 
424) found that local residents were generally positive to preserving farmland and open 
space. The reason was that they saw such preservation as beneficial to ensure the con-
tinuation of ³rural character´ (in the form of land use and cultural patterns that prevailed 
in Rhode Island when they were young) and ³quality of life´ in the state (access to open 
space, preservation of scenic quality (pretty landscapes), clean water and abundant wild-
life).   
Brunstad et al. (1999) investigated the relationship between the agricultural produc-
tion and the optimal level of landscape preservation. They claim that the non±market 
value of the agricultural landscape is a notion that seems to be gaining common accep-
tance. Brunstad et al. (1999, p. 539) argue that compared to the competitive equilibrium, 
a positive valuation of the agricultural landscape is an argument for increasing the agri-
cultural activity, and that the amount of increase should depend on the WTP. According 
to Brunstad et al. (1999, p. 539), a production-related subsidy in form of a subsidy per 
unit of land use is needed to reach the optimal solution regarding agricultural activity 
(land use) and landscape preservation.  
In an Austrian study, Pruckner (1995) evaluated the economic benefits (non±
commodity outputs) associated with agricultural landscape±cultivating services pro-
vided as an input on behalf of the tourism sector. Applying the contingent valuation 
method, tourists spending vacations in Austria were asked about their WTP for these 
landscape±cultivating services across the country. The values varied according to the 
tourists¶ nationality, with highest values registered by Austrian tourists and by Swiss 
tourists. The study also revealed that Austrian people did not consider recreation the 
only purpose of landscape±cultivating services, but also services as maintaining the liv-
ing space by ensuring protection from avalanches, landslides, erosion and rockslides. 
This may be an explanation for the higher WTP of respondents from Austria.  
In a recent Norwegian study, Bergland (1998) investigated peoples WTP for various 
landscape elements in a relatively intensively farmed arable area. Manipulated photos of 
the same landscape were presented to various groups of people. Zone vegetations along 
with open streams and paths, in combination, were seen as the most important landscape 
elements. WTP per household was NOK 175 for only stream; NOK 225 for only zone 
vegetations; and NOK 625 for both.  
However, Bohm (1988, p. 70) argues that it is difficult to determine people¶s real 
value of public goods through investigations on the willingness to pay because of the 
free-rider problem. In lack of a general solution, he points out that ³informed guesses´ 
by the elected parliament have had to be the basis for decisions on production and pay-
ments for public goods. However, in my view, studies where scientific quantification 
methods (as those mentioned above) are used to value the positive externalities/public 
goods would be of great help for the politicians in the decision±making process even 
though such studies may suffer from methodical problems, see for example Hutchinson 
et al. (1995) for some critical comments on the contingent valuation method. It should 
be emphasised that if the social value of the positive externalities or public goods in 
question turn out to be rather low public intervention to correct for these benefits may 
not be justified unless the costs of such intervention are quite low (Dillman and 
Bergstrom, 1991, p. 263). 
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Buckwell (1996, p. 211) argues that Europe is taking the lead in showing how agri-
culture can play the dual role as a provider of both food and rural environmental and 
cultural services:  
 
³These different outputs of European agriculture are, and always have been, 
inextricably intertwined, much more so than in the Americas and Oceania. « . 
European society is well aware of its rural roots and values the natural environ-
ment and cultural heritage of rural areas. « . Now it has been realised that not 
only must there be specific public actions to protect natural resources and en-
hance the environment, but that these actions must be integrated with other di-
mensions of agricultural and rural policy.´ (Buckwell, 1996, p. 211) 
 
According to Harvey (2003), the twin focus of sustainable policies should be to get the 
price of biomass ³right´ (without distorting and supporting it, as under the Common 
Agricultural Policy in the European Union), and to ³properly´ reflect the public or so-
cial values of the conservation, amenity, and rural environment (CARE) goods (includ-
ing pollution) back to landowners and users. However, Harvey (2003) emphasises that 
both social valuations and the underlying technical relationships vary between different 
regions and locations. Accordingly, appropriate policy prescriptions are likely to be 
highly site±specific. Another central point made by Harvey (1996, p. 29) is that ³attempts 
to define µlevel playing fields¶ in terms of common definitions of environmental practices 
(either within countries or, a fortiori, between them) is also a violation of the very con-
cept of sustainability as advanced here. The µlevel playing field¶ concept does not mean 
that trading nations (or regions) should have identical environmental conditions or iden-
tical social valuations (and hence opportunity costs) of environmental assets, any more 
than it means that they should have identical costs of land, labour or capital. In fact, it is 
regional and national differences in these resource endowments, capabilities and social 
valuations which provide the very basis for economic gains from trade.´ Krugman (1997) 
advocates the same type of economic thoughts as Harvey above. These arguments by 
Harvey (and Krugman) may imply that since rural environmental amenities typically have 
a national or local (regional) character and that the social valuations may differ between 
regions and countries, the decisions on the production of and payment for these positive 
externalities or public goods should also be taken at a national or local (regional) level 
and not internationally in the WTO (directly or even indirectly). Dillman and Bergstrom 
(1991, p. 264) also argue that the value of farm land amenity benefits are likely to vary 
between regions, and therefore region specific valuation studies are needed to obtain the 
most accurate estimates of the economic values of environmental amenity benefits of ag-
ricultural land retention for a particular planning or policy region.  
Since the social valuation of rural employment is typically higher in more remote, 
sparsely populated areas of a country, this may be an argument for a policy to enhance a 
more low±intensive agriculture regarding land use in these areas than elsewhere. It may 
also be an argument for a more labour±intensive agriculture in remote areas with few 
other job opportunities than elsewhere. For example, some argue that this can be an ar-
gument for promoting organic agriculture in less favoured areas that are more labour±
intensive than conventional, or modern agriculture. In this respect, it is interesting to 
notice that Swinbank (2001, p. 11) argues that whether or not a scheme would have a 
minimal trade±distorting effect, would probably hinge on its geographical coverage. He 
argues that a scheme applied in clearly defined regions, with well defined objectives, 
might pass the test of being minimal trade±distorting, while schemes that provide blan-
ket coverage to all a country¶s farmers regardless of their situation, or schemes simply 
devised to offset additional costs of production caused by adverse terrain or climate, 
would probably not pass. Accordingly, the suggestion should be that the ³green box´ might 
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be widened to include measures that are production±linked providing they are confined to 
very specific regions and are not applied as a nation±wide policy (Swinbank, 2001, p. 11). 
Flnm and Vnrdal (1990) claim that subsidies given as product±specific support, either by 
supporting farm inputs or products easily lead to inefficient resource utilization. Instead, 
they suggest allocating necessary income support as a special tax allowance on farm±based 
income, in addition to a lump±sum payment. If farm income should be less than the calcu-
lated tax allowance, they propose the payment of a lump±sum in addition to the farmers¶ tax 
advantage. In practical terms, their proposal represents a kind of ³subsidy per farm´. This 
tax±based policy instrument may, in addition to the general income effect, be of interest in a 
regional policy context since it allows the differentiation of the tax allowance and the lump±
sum payments on the basis of farm size, region, topography or climate.  
Prestegard (1992) analysed the effects of a regional support differentiated only by the al-
ternative value of labour and not according to farm size structure (or regional differences in 
conditions for farming), by using a recursive linear programming model over Norwegian 
agriculture. This regional subsidy thus increases with decreasing possibilities for alternative 
employment. All farms within any given region receive the same amount of support, which 
thus represents a type of non±product±specific policy instrument (as ³per-farm payments´). 
Prestegard concludes that such a regional support policy based on alternative employment 
potential seems to have a much stronger regional policy effect (greater number of farms in 
operation, especially small, part-time farms) than structurally differentiated regional defi-
ciency payments.  
In OECD (1998, p. 57), several reports on the connection between agriculture and the rural 
economy in the OECD countries is analysed, and the primary sector is found to have the larg-
est income and employment multipliers in both predominantly rural and significantly rural 
regions. However, Doyle et al. (1997, p. 530-531) argue that the presumption that agricultural 
support is an effective means for promoting social and economic development in rural areas is 
largely untested. To be true, two conditions must be satisfied (Doyle et al., 1997, p. 531): 
 
 ³First, agriculture must have a high degree of interdependence with other sectors 
of the local economy so that any support-induced increase in farm output create sig-
nificant numbers of jobs outside agriculture. Second, the wider economic benefits 
arising from public assistance to agriculture should be concentrated in rural areas.´ 
 
In a study of a region in Scotland (Dumfries and Galloway), Doyle et al. (1997, p. 545±545) 
find that their results indicate that agricultural±support payments are effective in stimulating 
social and economic development of rural areas. However, they find that a considerable 
proportion of the ultimate economic benefits accrue to urban areas.  
Some economists argue that support to enhance rural employment should not be given as 
specific agricultural support, but as general support to all economic activities within speci-
fied regions. Theoretically, this is a highly valid argument. However, due to competition 
rules within the WTO, and within the European Economic Area, EEA (EU-15 + Iceland, 
Norway and Liechtenstein), it may be difficult or even impossibly to shift support from 
agriculture to other economic activities in specific regions within countries belonging to the 
EEA. Another possibility, which may have positive effects on employment and settlement 
in regions that suffers from depopulation and unemployment, is to give tax allowances to all 
citizens living in such areas. Such tax allowances are hitherto not covered by WTO rules or 
rules within the EEA, i.e., they are not regulated. Actually, Norway provides citizens living 
in the northern most county Finnmark and parts of the county Troms a special tax allow-
ance compared to citizens living elsewhere in Norway.   
 
Multifunctional agriculture and the design of policy instruments: Application to the WTO negotiations on agriculture 
Senter for matpolitikk og marked/ Norsk institXtt for landErXks¡konomisk forskning 2004 
19
The demand for or need to preserve cultural landscapes, other environmental amenities, 
and viable rural areas is widely recognized in Switzerland, Norway, the European Union, 
Japan, Korea and many other (mainly importing) countries; in contrast, it is not an impor-
tant element of agricultural and rural policy in (mainly exporting) countries with large 
areas of arable land, such as the USA and the Cairns Group. Ian Hodge contrasts two al-
ternative models or perspectives of the way ³in which the issue of rural environmental 
values is assumed to enter into agricultural policy analysis´ (Hodge, 2000, p. 264). The 
first, ³input model´ postulates an ³inevitable and clear relationship between output prices 
and environmental quality´, and that ´a reduction in the level of price support inevitably 
leads to a reduced intensity of production and thus to an improvement in environmental 
quality´ (Hodge, 2000, p.264). Many North American, Australian and New Zealand agri-
cultural economists favour this approach or model (Bredahl, Nersten and Prestegard, 
1999). The second, although not necessarily conflicting model, ³emphasises marketed 
food and environmental quality as separate products of the land «. These are often seen 
as joint products that can be produced in varying combinations´ (Hodge, 2000, p. 264). 
Many European and Japanese agricultural economists favour this second alternative6, 
which Hodge calls the ³output model´. Economists following the ³input model´ predict 
degradation in the environment if agricultural policies lead to increased prices and pro-
duction. Conversely, economists favouring the ³output model´ can rationalise an in-
crease in environmental benefits from policies leading to increased agricultural output. 
In Figure 2, the issues discussed by Hodge (2000) are ³translated´ into a graphical 
representation7 of positive and negative externalities of agricultural production (inten-
sity). At low levels of output (intensity), agricultural output and environmental services 
                                                 
 6 As good examples hereof, see Potter and Burney (2002), Latacz±Lohman (2000), and 
Latacz±Lohman and Hodge (2001). 
 7 Whittaker et al. (1991) used a quite similar graphical representation of marginal private and 
social costs and benefits of agricultural production in an economic analysis of environmental 
management agreements in the UK.   
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are joint or complementary, which is shown as a positive externality in Figure 6.1 The 
marginal social cost of agricultural production lies below the marginal private cost of 
agricultural production. Beyond some level of output (intensity), agricultural production 
reduces the level of countryside services or the quality of the environment, i.e., further 
output creates a negative externality. In this respect, it is worth noticing that Le Goffe 
(2000, p. 397) argues that monoculture and intensification of production often leads to 
the simultaneous appearance of negative externalities and the cancellation of positive 
services provided by agriculture. Agricultural economists in North America, Australia 
and New Zealand often promote the ³polluter pays´ principle and the levying of taxes to 
correct for negative externalities, such as environmental pollution. These agricultural 
economists have been less keen when proposing policies to produce the optimum level 
of a positive externality, and for a good reason; agricultural activities in those countries 
are seldom perceived to produce positive externalities, such as for example a cultural 
landscape (Bredahl, Nersten and Prestegard, 1999). 
 
 
Figure 6.1  Representation of positive and negative externalities of agricultural pro-
duction levels (intensity) 
Source: Bredahl, Nersten and Prestegard (1999) 
 
 
Pigou suggested already in 1920 the use of taxes on negative external effects and subsi-
dies on positive external effects to correct allocative distortions8. Bhagwati (1971- 76-
                                                 
 8 However, there is an opposite view that is a reaction to the Pigovian approach. This politi-
cal economy approach rejects the all-knowing, benevolent government view and questions 
the assumption of correcting market failures in a perfect and costless manner. In trying to 
correct market failures, the government may find itself subject to ©failureª because politi-
cians and bureaucrats have their own self-interest (Swinnen and van der Zee, 1993, p. 263). 
As production increases, 
environment and 
production become 
competitive rather than 
complementary.
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80) and Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1998, p. 86±87) ³confirm´ Pigou¶s view that in 
case of a domestic market distortion caused by a pure production externality the first 
best policy will be an optimum production subsidy (or an equivalent tax-cum-subsidy). 
The second best policy will be either tariff (trade subsidy) or factor tax-cum-subsidies. 
Corden (1997, p. 7-9) also argues that a price subsidy will be an optimum policy in case 
of a domestic distortion/divergence caused by a positive production externality. How-
ever, Corden (1997, p. 33) argues that this result is based on the four assumptions of the 
theory of domestic divergence:  
 
(1) Subsidies can be financed by ³nondistorting´ taxes.  
(2) Taxation involves no collection costs.  
(3) There are no costs of disbursement of subsidies.  
(4) The income distribution effects of various policies (such as the redistribution from 
taxpayers to subsidy recipients) can be neglected.  
 
In Corden (1997) each of these assumptions is considered. The conclusions are that 
though the analysis has to be modified, the central argument is unshaken by the removal 
of assumptions (1) and (4). Removal of assumption (2) will slightly dent it, while re-
moval of assumption (3) will affect it (a tariff may be first-best policy) (Corden, 1997, 
p. 33). However, Corden (1997, p. 39) also concludes that in developed countries sub-
sidy disbursement costs are unlikely to be high.  
It follows from Bhagwati (1971), Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1998), and Corden 
(1997) that a simple rejection of the possible use of a production subsidy as a corrective 
measure in case of a domestic market distortion caused by a positive agricultural pro-
duction externality (which in principle is done in the WTO since a budget price subsidy 
is not allowed within the existing ³green box´), is not consistent with economic theory. 
It is also worth noting that the question of possible trade-distortion effects of such price 
interventions in domestic markets is not mentioned at all by Bhagwati (1971), Bhagwati 
and Ramaswami (1998), or Corden (1997), while it is a major issue within the WTO. 
Presumably, that reflects that this issue has more to do with political economy (and in-
ternational politics) than with economic theory in itself9. In this connection, Burrell 
(2001, p. 13) puts forward some interesting comments:  
 
³On the question of whether it actually make sense for corrective policies to be 
minimally distorting, Blandford (2001, p.52) observes that in the presence of an 
unmarketable externality, the market is already distorted. If direct payments are 
made to farmers to correct for market failure and to remunerate externalities, it is 
hardly logical to require that they should have no effect on production and trade. 
This discussion highlights the need for a better definition of a minimally distorting 
policy. If the distortion is measured against a ³first-best´ situation, it generally 
involves reference to market supply and demand functions that can only be dis-
covered econometrically, and hence can always be disputed. Alternatively, if the 
                                                 
 9 In fact, there is something ©puzzlingª about the debate on trade negotiations and trade lib-
eralisation. Often, it seems that the debate has more to with what Krugman (1997, p. 114±
115) calls a mercantilist theory, or mercantilist language of trade negotiations, than with the 
economic case for free trade. Krugman (1997, p. 114) emphasizes:  
 ³Anyone who has tried to make sense of international trade negotiations eventually realizes 
that they can only be understood by realizing that they are a game scored according to mer-
cantilist rules, in which an increase in export no matter how expensive to produce in terms 
of other opportunities foregone is a victory, and an increase in import no matter how 
many resources it releases for other uses is a defeat. ´    
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change in production is measured against the current (distorted) level, why 
should it be zero?´ 
 
Viewed in this light, it is surprising that the clarification of non-distorting measures 
does not seem to play any significant role in the ongoing WTO negotiations.  
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In Figure 7.1, the opening of a small (protected) economy to free trade while simultane-
ously adopting an optimum policy to correct for a positive externality or public good is 
illustrated in a partial equilibrium supply-demand framework often used in analysing 
trade impacts of domestic policies. The diagram depicts Hodge¶s ³output model´, that is 
countryside services, or viable rural areas, as a joint product of agricultural production. 
(Of course, Figure 7.1 represents a simplification of the real world since the jointness 
between agricultural production (output) and positive externalities/public goods seldom 
will be exactly 1:1.) In the domestic market the marginal private cost of agricultural 
production is shown as the S(MPC) curve, while that adjusted for the positive external-
ity is shown as the marginal social cost curve S(MSC). Because we are dealing with a 
positive externality, the marginal social cost curve lies below the marginal private cost 
curve.  
The autarky, no trade, equilibrium quantity is indicated by Qa, and the equilibrium 
supply-and-demand price is Pa. Under free trade (world market price is Pw), with no 
allowance for the positive externality, Qs is supplied and Qd is demanded. The quantity 
imported is the difference between Qd and Qs. The welfare effects of this policy com-
pared to autarky is: 
 
Gain in consumer surplus: +ABIF 
Loss in producer surplus:  -ABGF 
Loss in externality:  -GBEJ 
The net welfare effect is:  +BIHE ±GHJ (which may be positive or negative)   
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 Figure 7.1 Illustration of trade liberalisation for a small (protected) economy                             
and adoption of any optimum environmental and/or rural subsidy policy
 
The optimum subsidy policy equates S(MSC) with the marginal revenue (Pw). Under 
this subsidy policy, output expands to Qs,t. The optimum (per unit) subsidy is the differ-
ence between the world market price, Pw, and the supply price, Ps,t. Demand remains 
unaltered at Qd (because of the small country assumption). The quantity imported is the 
difference between Qd and Qs,t. The welfare effect of this subsidy policy compared to 
autarky is: 
 
Gain in consumer surplus: +ABIF 
Loss in producer surplus: -ABDC 
Loss in externality:  -DBEH 
Taxpayers¶ costs:  -CDHF 
The net welfare effect is:  +BIHE 
 
Clearly, the nation is better off with this subsidy policy than simply opening its markets 
to trade and ignoring the potential benefits of the positive externality/public good (gains 
GHJ). The exporting countries also gain from the liberalisation of trade, but not as much 
as they would gain if the importing country did not subsidise production. 
Farmers in the importing country, however, may lobby for additional income sup-
port. The reason is that opening the economy to trade eliminates the economic rents 
received through market price support. However, this unwarranted rent seeking may be 
prevented by implementing a rule that limits the quantity supported to the current level 
of output, or to some proportion of the current level. It would also mean that the in-
crease in consumption must necessarily result in increased imports. Gaisford and Kerr 
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(2001, p. 102) argue that the trade±distorting effects and inefficiencies associated with 
production subsidies themselves could be reduced by making subsidy payments subject 
to quantity limits. For example, they argue that headage payments could be based on a 
fixed maximum number of animals and acreage payments on a fixed maximum area 
planted. In addition, they mention that another possibility is to have subsidy payments 
based on historic, rather than current, level of production. 
In the analysis above, the optimum subsidy has been referred to as a production sub-
sidy (linked to output). Depending on the actual degree of jointness or complementarity 
between agricultural production and the positive externality or public good in question, 
the optimum subsidy may be a subsidy on output (possibly also a regionalised price 
subsidy), but it may also be a subsidy linked to factors of production or otherwise linked 
to agricultural production processes. In deciding which policies (measures) to use, one 
also has to keep in mind that there will always be a trade-off between precision and 
transaction costs (i.e., costs of information gathering, decision making, contracting and 
controlling) regarding any policy (Vatn, 2002). Taking this into consideration, in some 
cases the simple solution from an administrative perspective production sup-
port may be targeted enough (Vatn, 1999, p. 12).  
Hodge (2000) also argues that the objectives of multifunctionality in agriculture ad-
mits some level of production±related support if: countryside services are produced as 
complementary joint products with agricultural production, where production of agri-
cultural products necessarily entails production of countryside services; these country-
side services have significant public good characteristics and hence suffer missing mar-
kets; and if the attributes of the services are either impossible to separately identify and 
impractically difficult and costly to measure. In these circumstances, Hodge (2000, p. 
271) argues that payments to farmers can represent the correction of a market failure 
rather than a distortion to trading relationships. Hodge thus concludes that such pay-
ments should not be included in an Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS) as far as 
trade negotiations are concerned in other words that such payments should be treated 
as ³green´ (as allowed support). Hodge (2000, p. 271-272) suggests that the criteria 
against which claims for such ³green box´ status for payments to farmers for farming 
are valid should include; ³whether the provision of the value is regarded as an external 
benefit, such that the Provider Gets Principle applies; whether in the absence of that 
payment, the environmental value would be below the level demanded; whether there is 
a demonstrable link between the action that is supported through the payment and the 
specific external benefits; whether the policy mechanism is targeted on the most appro-
priate indicator.´ Hodge (2000, p. 272) admits that these criteria will often be difficult 
to determine unambiguously, and that transparency with regard to these issues will thus 
be an important factor in assessing particular policy measures. 
In their analysis, Paarlberg et al. (2002) are using a conceptual model that clarifies 
the effects of multifunctionality by modifying the social utility function to incorporate 
externalities. Their conclusions and proposals are:  
 
³First, multifunctionality never justifies trade barriers. Second, multi±
functionality may justify domestic output subsidies or taxes if the level of the ex-
ternality is tied to output levels. Third, the extent of support to domestic agricul-
ture varies by nation. Fourth, nations have the incentive to inflate the importance 
of multifunctionality to disguise protection, so strong disciplines must be negoti-
ated. Three criteria for Green Box commodity policy intervention due to multi-
functionality are proposed to reduce the problem of disguised protection and to 
improve transparency. First, a nation would need to explicitly identify the exter-
nalities due to multifunctionality. Second, a nation would need to value those ex-
ternalities using standard market and nonmarket valuation techniques. Third, the 
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values of the externalities would have to be explicitly linked to commodity output 
levels.´(Paarlberg et al., 2002, p. 332±333) 
 
However, could the same, or even more valued landscapes be obtained with other types 
of agricultural production methods than are common today? Kuiper (1997), Rossi and 
Nota (2000), and Hendriks et al. (2000), for example, suggest that organic farms can 
have more positive effects on landscape values than conventional farms (greater diver-
sity of landscapes, ecosystems and species). Or could an entirely different usage of 
farmland, e.g. golf courses, be equally, or even more valued? (Anderson, 1998). On the 
other hand, will the people value a landscape that merely forms the backdrop for their 
daily lives as much as a landscape based on ³normal´ or ³real´ agricultural production? 
In an Austrian study, over 4000 tourists spending vacations in Austria were questioned 
whether a well±kept landscape was the decisive factor in spending a vacation in Austria. 
Pruckner (1995, p. 178) found that 84% of the respondents answered ³yes´. Respon-
dents were also asked if farmers or other specialists should provide landscape±related 
services. Two±thirds voted in favour of the farmers, while another 7% expressed indif-
ference between the two groups (Pruckner, 1995, p. 178). Notice also Potter and Burney 
(2002, p. 43) who argue; ³ there are few alternative management regimes which can 
mimic the conservation benefits of grazing, mowing, burning or harvesting in the ab-
sence of farming´. 
A study by Romstad et al. (2000) provides insights into the optimal mix of policy in-
struments given the existence of jointness in production. In their analysis of multifunc-
tionality in agriculture, Romstad et al. (2000, p. xv) conclude that under Norwegian 
conditions a policy should include payments for public goods/positive externalities and 
taxes (or other regulations) to reduce negative externalities, and the use of regionally 
differentiated product prices including some import levies. This study then is much in 
line with Hodge (2000) and Paarlberg et al. (2002); however, the argument for some use 
of import levies in formulating a good policy package for a multifunctional agriculture 
is not.  
Although some economists argue that jointness between agricultural production and 
positive externalities/public goods may justify production±related support or payments, 
other economists are highly sceptical towards this. These economists argue that even if 
there is jointness the payments for the provision of public goods should be totally de-
coupled from agricultural production10, i.e., that the payments should be linked directly 
to the public goods provision (see for example Bohman et al. (1999) and Gaisford and 
Kerr (2001, p. 104±105)). Certainly, in my view, for positive externalities/public goods 
such as hedgerows, stonewalls, water polls, streams, and specific habitats for wildlife 
and plants in the agricultural landscape, farmers should be paid directly for the preserva-
tion and cultivation of these landscape elements in accordance with society¶s wants, i.e., 
the payments should be decoupled from agricultural production. The reason why is that 
these externalities/public goods are not strictly joint to the private good production 
(food and fibre), actually they are often competitive; especially at high intensity levels 
of agricultural production. Such environmental payments would probably often be 
based on specific contracts between the farmer or group of farmers and the (local or 
regional) authorities. Such programs would naturally be ³deep and narrow´ and may 
have high transactions costs, i.e., costs of information gathering, decision making, con-
tract formulation, controlling, etc.  
                                                 
 10 However, Josling (2000, p. 777) points out that ³there is no such thing as a production-
neutral payment, however much decoupled from current output decisions, unless output is 
controlled as a condition for payment. ´ 
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However, regarding the cultural landscape in a broader sense, such as for example 
the open landscapes created by agricultural activities, or viable rural areas, where there 
exist some jointness or complementarity between agricultural production activities and 
these externalities or public goods, totally decoupled support would not be economic 
effective, as shown above. It would be better to use rather ³broad and shallow´ pro-
grams such as a rather general acreage payment programme where farmers have to fol-
low/admit to certain rules regarding agricultural activities/practices to preserve and take 
care of the totality of the agricultural landscapes due to environmental values and rec-
reational values, to be eligible for these payments (³cross compliance´). The same ar-
guments may go for the use of general ³per±farm payments´ to enhance settlement and 
activity in rural areas suffering from depopulation and desertification, or for headage 
payment programmes to enhance grazing, or to enhance an environmental and animal 
welfare friendly husbandry in general, or for headage programmes to preserve and take 
care of rare animal breeds. Typically, such payment programmes would have rather low 
transactions costs since they normally would be based on national programmes without 
specific contracts with individual farmers. 
 Swinbank (2001, p. 12) points out that the ³green box´ requirements for environ-
mental payments insist that as well as forming a clearly defined governmental environ-
mental or conservation programme and being dependent on the fulfilment of specific 
conditions, the actual subsidy should be limited to extra costs or loss of income in-
volved in complying with the government programme. He continues by arguing that if 
carried to excess, with farm or location specific requirements with respect to the setting 
and monitoring of obligations and payment levels, administrative (transactions) costs 
for the regulator and the regulated could escalate, and that consequently some balance 
between generic and site±specific programmes must be found.  
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Sovereign countries have the right to decide upon their own agricultural objectives re-
garding non±trade concerns such as food security, cultural landscape, land conservation, 
biodiversity, recreation, cultural heritage, animal welfare, and viable rural areas, etc. In 
my view, based on Figure 7.1 and the adjacent analysis, and other research results pre-
sented here, countries should be allowed to use production±related support or payment 
programmes to help agriculture perform its many roles (i.e., to enhance a multifunc-
tional agriculture) according to certain carefully described WTO rules, which will be 
presented and discussed below. Clearly, policies to obtain the production of the opti-
mum quantity of cultural landscape, other countryside services, or viable rural areas 
must distort trade to some degree. I argue, however, that just as a tax is widely accepted 
as the optimum policy for a negative externality, so should the use of a production±tied 
subsidy or payment be accepted as optimum policy for a positive externality or public 
good that is produced jointly with or complementary to agricultural production. From 
another perspective, it is foolish to undertake those policies that secure the production 
of positive externalities or public goods free of trade reprisals. Of course, to do so re-
quires the development of carefully specified international rules to prevent such policies 
from becoming a form of protectionism.  
An essential element of my approach, and the first of my proposed rules, is that na-
tions cannot subsidise exports or place import tariffs on any agricultural and food prod-
ucts11. As shown in Figure 7.1, this results in an expansion of consumption, and imports 
for trading partners. This removal of market support in a country should, according to 
the discussion earlier on compensation for farmers income and assets losses, be accom-
panied by finite lump±sum payments to the farmers over a certain number of years to 
                                                 
 11 However, there is an argument to retain a small tariff of for example 20-25%, to avoid big 
price fluctuations domestically due to changing world market prices, and thereby giving 
benefits to risk±averse farmers. In addition, there may also still be arguments for retaining 
the Special Safeguard Mechanism for agriculture, though possibly in a modified form. 
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compensate for the losses (at least partly), regardless of what they may do after the re-
moval12.  
But, the level of optimum subsidy or payment and associated level of output after 
trade are not known. A nation could respond to producer pressure and introduce subsi-
dies giving rise to a level of output equal to the level of consumption at the free trade 
price. However, limiting the quantity supported to the current levels of outputs (or input 
uses), or to some proportion of the current levels, would allow the nation to meet its 
objectives for positive externalities or public goods like the cultural landscape and vi-
able rural areas, and would mean that the increase in consumption must necessarily re-
sult in increased imports.  
As a kind of trade±off in the WTO negotiations between (mainly) exporting coun-
tries (as the United States, the Cairns group, and several developing countries) for the 
removal of market support and (mainly) importing countries for the abilities to en-
hance a multifunctional agriculture the maximum level of allowed acreage payments 
and headage payments could for example respectively be set to 85±90% of the current 
planted area and of current numbers of animals, and the maximum level of agricultural 
budget price support could possible be set at for example 75±80 % of current outputs 
(budget price support are more trade±distorting than both headage and acreage pay-
ments). The actual percentages would, of course, need to be a result of the WTO nego-
tiations.  
By implementing such a 75±80 % level for maximum allowed agricultural support 
on outputs, we would also avoid that arguments for food security are misused to achieve 
full self±sufficiency (i.e., to prevent imports). However, food security concerns may 
give arguments for keeping an active agricultural production in all parts of a country. 
This may imply that budget price supports should be regionally differentiated. Region-
alised budget price supports may also be beneficial for the up keeping of agricultural 
activity in areas that suffers from depopulation and few other job opportunities. Of 
course, the acreage payments may also be regionally differentiated due to the same ar-
guments. Regional differentiation of acreage payments may also be justified due to re-
gional differences in the social valuation of the cultural landscape and other public envi-
ronmental goods and services.   
One effect of a removal of all border measures is that we would get rid of all current 
TRQs (current access quotas and minimal access quotas) in the WTO. All currently bi-
lateral agreements with preferential tariffs would at the same time lose their ef-
fects/importance. This would result in a less complicated WTO agreement and in in-
creased transparency and reduced transactions costs in international trade, which would 
be beneficial to actors in international trade and for the overall welfare level in the 
world.  
My second condition, in addition to the elimination of border measures, requires a re-
formulation of ³green box´ criteria. ³Green box´ criteria would need to explicitly in-
clude production-tied support or payment programmes13 that meet certain carefully pre-
                                                 
 12 Some economists have proposed a slightly different compensation scheme; the so±called 
bond scheme (Tangermann (1991), Harvey (1998, p. 421-422), and Swinbank and Tanger-
mann (2001), see also Ingersent (2002) for a sceptical view on the bond scheme proposal, 
and with a reply by Alan Swinbank and Stefan Tangermann).  
 13 Latacz±Lohman (2000) also argues that policy options to enhance the provision of multi-
functional benefits, should not be constrained by arbitrary rules preventing any actions that 
have any significant effects on production and trade. Latacz±Lohman (2000) and Latacz±
Lohman and Hodge (2001, p. 44) also call for a widening of the ³green box´ to accommo-
date jointness of production and propose an extended set of ³green box´ criteria to ensure 
that only ³trade-correcting measures´ can pass.  
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scribed requirements, i.e., that meet the proposed limitations for budget price support, 
and for the use of acreage payments and headage payments, given above. Alternatively, 
the ³blue box´ with its present room for support or payment programmes that limit pro-
duction, and which actually are close to my proposed WTO rules, should be maintained 
without limitations.  
Compared to my findings and suggestions for WTO trade rules as presented above, 
what is then the actual development and status of the WTO negotiations? The chairper-
son of the WTO negotiations on agriculture, Stuart Harbinson, presented a draft on mo-
dalities for the further commitments in February 2003 (WTO, 2003b). Harbinson pro-
posed substantial reductions in tariffs, especially for tariffs above 90 % ad valorem. 
Regarding export subsidies, he proposed an abolishment within 9 years. Further, the 
proposal was that AMS14 (Aggregate Measurement of Support) should be reduced by 60 
% and the ³blue box´ support by 50 % over a period of 5 years, while the existing 
³green box´ criteria should be extended (only minor changes were proposed). This draft 
was regarded by some countries as going too far (for example the European Community 
(EC), Norway and Japan), and by others (the Cairns Group, the United States and sev-
eral developing countries) as going too short in removing trade distortions. In a joint 
statement on non±trade concerns on 28 February 2003, Bulgaria, Chinese Taipei, Ice-
land, Israel, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Norway and Switzerland emphasised that ³On 
domestic support we foresee the continuation of the Green and Blue boxes without limi-
tations, based on the existing framework and with necessary adjustments to take non-
trade concerns duly into account´ (Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture, 2003).  
On 13 August 2003 a joint EC - U.S. paper on agriculture was released. One ele-
ment of the joint paper is that direct payments under the ³blue box´ ³shall not exceed 
5% of the total value of agriculture production by the end of the implementation period´ 
(U.S. Department of State, 2003). It must be seen as a clear movement by the EC away 
from its former negotiation position that the ³blue box´ should be maintained (i.e., not 
reduced). Probably, it is a consequence of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) re-
form decision by the EC Council in June 2003 that will make it possible for the EC to 
³transfer´ large parts of their acreage and headage payments from their current position 
in the ³blue box´ to the ³green box´ in the form of (more) decoupled ³per-farm pay-
ments´.    
At the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in Canc~n, Mexico, in September 2003, 
the chairperson Luis Ernesto Derbez presented a draft Canc~n Ministerial Text also con-
taining a framework for establishing modalities for the further negotiations on agricul-
ture. The draft asked for commitments for substantial reductions in tariffs and trade±
distorting domestic support, but only one explicit figure was mentioned: The draft pro-
posed that the ³blue box´ support ³shall not exceed 5% of the total value of agriculture 
production in the 2000-2002 period by >«@. Subsequently, such support shall be subject 
to an annual linear reduction of >«@% for a further period of >«@ years´ (WTO, 
2003c). In addition, the proposal was that the ³Green Box criteria shall be reviewed 
with a view to ensuring that Green Box measures have no, or at most minimal, trade±
distorting effects or effects on production´ (WTO, 2003c).  
                                                 
 14 AMS is a measure of the ³amber box´ support. 
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The Canc~n Ministerial Conference ended with a breakdown on 14 September 2003 
after developed and developing countries failed to resolve the conflict on the ³Singapore 
issues´, i.e., investment, competition, public procurement and trade facilitation. The 
agricultural negotiations were also an area of substantial conflict, but some progress was 
made. The WTO members agreed to continue the trade negotiations at the WTO head-
quarter in Geneva.  
To sum up, the actual development in the WTO negotiations on agriculture are rather 
contrary to my findings and suggestions for WTO trade rules presented above. In addi-
tion, it does not seem that the issue of non±trade concerns and multifunctional agricul-
ture play any significant role in the negotiations, while these issues certainly deserve 
attention according to neo±classical economic theory. 
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A clear distinction should be made between policies that aim to improve farmers¶ in-
come situation and policies intended to enhance a multifunctional agriculture. In other 
words, we should not mix the focus on the farmers¶ consumption abilities (income con-
cerns) and the focus on the farmers as producers of both private and public goods. In-
come support to farmers should be decoupled from production. Decoupling is, however, 
not an obvious criterion for the desirability of domestic policy that does not have farm 
income as its objective, such as for example an objective for enhancing a multifunc-
tional agriculture. However, multifunctionality can hardly justify the use of market sup-
port while it may justify budget support. Clearly, policies to obtain the production of the 
optimum quantity of cultural landscape or other countryside services must distort trade 
to some degree. I argue, however, that just as a tax is widely accepted as the optimum 
policy for a negative externality, so should the use of a production±related subsidy or 
payment be accepted as optimum policy for a positive externality or public good that is 
produced jointly with or complementary to agricultural production. To prevent such 
policies from becoming a form of protectionism, some carefully prescribed WTO trade 
rules should be implemented.  
The first rule is that nations cannot subsidise exports or place import tariffs on any 
agricultural and food products. Secondly, the budget support should be limited to the 
current levels of outputs or input uses, or to some proportion of the current levels. This 
would still to a substantial degree, allow the nation to meet its domestic policy objec-
tives for the provision of positive externalities or public goods such as the cultural land-
scape or viable rural areas. This would also mean that the increase in consumption must 
necessarily result in increased imports from trading partners. In addition to the elimina-
tion of border measures (tariffs and export subsidies), a reformulation of ³green box´ 
criteria is required. ³Green box´ criteria would need to explicitly include production±
related support or payment programmes that meet the proposed limitations for budget 
support, as presented above. Alternatively, the ³blue box´ with its present room for 
support or payment programmes that limit production, and which actually are close to 
my proposed WTO rules, should be maintained without limitations.  
Clearly, the development in the WTO negotiations and the latest draft proposal by 
Luis Ernesto Derbez with its strong focus on very large reduction in ³blue box´ support 
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(presumably, with a view of phasing such support out) and a possible tightening of the 
rules on ³green box´ support, is contrary to my findings and suggestions for WTO trade 
rules as presented above. I find the ³tough´ attitude towards large reductions in domes-
tic support, and in particular the proposals for very large reductions in ³blue box´ sup-
port, while at the same time being rather ³vague´ on suggesting substantial reduction in 
market support, rather surprising and contrary to neo±classical economic theory. (Mar-
ket support is less economic efficient than budget support to correct for domestic distor-
tions, and also more trade±distorting.) In fact, I cannot help wondering if the ongoing 
WTO agricultural trade negotiations actually ³prove´ that Krugman (1997, p. 114) is 
right when he argues that an implicit mercantilist theory underlies international trade 
negotiations rather than the economic case for free trade. My proposal, to eliminate all 
border measures and to change the ³green box´ criteria to allow tightly prescribed pro-
duction±related subsidies or payment programmes, or, alternatively that the ³blue box´ 
is maintained without limitations, may provide a better way forward towards a balanced 
WTO agriculture agreement15. 
 
                                                 
 15 The focus in this paper has been on developed countries. History shows us that every de-
veloped country during its developing process has supported agriculture, and still does ex-
tensively. It is hardly logical to deny developing countries this opportunity. Therefore, the 
developing countries should be given special and differential treatment as provided for in Ar-
ticle 20 of the Uruguay Round¶s Agreement on Agriculture. 
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